Gazprom's position on the Russian gas market weakening. OSW Commentary No. 70, 2012-02-23 by Paszyc, Ewa
1ce
s
 
c
O
M
M
e
N
T
A
R
y
 
 
c
e
n
t
r
e
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
 
c
e
s
 
c
O
M
M
e
N
T
A
R
y
 
 
c
e
n
t
r
e
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
 
c
e
s
 
c
O
M
M
e
N
T
A
R
y
cOMMeNTARyOsw
i s s u e  7 0  |  2 3 . 0 2 . 2 0 1 2  |  c e N T R e  f O R  e A s T e R N  s T u d i e s
OSW.WAW.PL
Gazprom’s position on the Russian gas market weakening
Ewa Paszyc
As the difficulties Gazprom has faced in recent years on the European 
market have multiplied1, so more and more symptoms have appeared 
which may suggest that the company’s dominant position is deteriorating. 
The decision made by the Russian government in June 2011 to double the 
tax Gazprom has to pay on the extraction of gas, which was later approved 
by parliament, was the first time in many years when the company’s fi-
scal privileges were withdrawn. The process of Gazprom’s assets being ta-
ken over by private companies and business partners from within Vladimir 
Putin’s closest circle is underway. More and more frequently attempts are 
being made to challenge the company’s monopoly in areas of key importan-
ce for the functioning of the entire gas sector, such as Gazprom’s exclusive 
right to dispose of the Russian gas transportation system and its exports 
monopoly. Competition from independent gas producers on the domestic 
market is growing, and Gazprom is gradually being pushed out of some 
of that market’s most profitable segments (industrial clients). 
The emerging tendencies in the Russian gas sector derive from a number of 
factors – from the situation on the European gas market, through difficul-
ties hampering the development of the sector in Russia itself, to the private 
interests of the current ruling class and its business partners. The plans for 
a structural reform of the monopoly (including isolating gas transportation 
system from Gazprom), presented since 2000 by the Ministry for Economic 
Development and since 2003 by the Russian Association of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), suggest a direction for the changes necessary to 
stimulate the sector’s development and improve the efficiency of Gazprom 
itself. However, the monopolist’s current business model gives the govern-
ment full control over this strategic enterprise, which is a core of Putin’s 
concept for developing Russia as a global energy power. Despite Putin’s re-
cent statement that he “does not rule out privatising Gazprom in the future” 
(made at a meeting with political scientists in Moscow on 6 February this 
year), any structural reform of Gazprom (and consequently, a weakening 
of the state’s control over it) seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Still, 
the developments on the domestic market – growing pressure from other gas 
companies (oil corporations and independent producers) and changes on 
the European market2 – may result in the weakening of Gazprom’s monopoly 
privileges and a gradual deterioration of its special status within Russia.
	
1	 The	difficulties	
Gazprom	is	facing	
in	Europe	are	caused,	
among	other	factors,	
by	the	financial	crisis.	
Since	2009	
the	demand	for	gas	
has	been	lower	than	
in	previous	years,	
and	the	volume	of	
Russian	gas	sales	has	
fallen	(from	around	
168	billion	m3	
in	2008	to	around	
148	billion	m3	
in	2010).	Another	
reason	for	this	drop	
is	the	radical	change	
in	the	European	gas	
market:	a	sudden	
increase	in	the	supply	
of	LNG	and	the	result-
ing	oversupply	
of	gas,	as	well	as	
the	attempts	made	
by	the	EU	to	reduce	
its	dependence	on	
the	Russian	supplier	
(including	antitrust	
regulations	concerning	
the	energy	market).	
For	more	on	this	
subject,	see	Ewa	
Paszyc,	‘Nord	and	
South	Stream	won’t	
save	Gazprom’,	
OSW Commentary,	
January	2010.
2	 For	example,	
an	improvement	in	
the	market	situation	
and	a	significant	in-
crease	in	demand	for	
gas	in	Europe	could	
force	measures	which	
could	stimulate	in-
dependent	producers	
(gas	companies	and	
oil	corporations)	to	
increase	their	extrac-
tion	volume;	one	such	
measure	could	be	the	
liberalisation	of	access	
for	all	gas	producers	
to	the	gas	transporta-
tion	system.
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Putin’s oligarchs – a new chapter 
in the redistribution of Gazprom’s assets 
In	2001	Alexey	Miller	–	Gazprom’s	CEO,	newly	appointed	by	President	Putin	–	started	his	
term	 in	office	with	a	spectacular	campaign	aimed	at	 regaining	Gazprom’s	 former	assets	
which	had	been	taken	over	in	the	1990s	by	private	companies	and	business	people	associ-
ated	with	his	predecessor,	the	company’s	long-time	CEO	Rem	Vyakhirev.	The	largest	benefi-
ciary	of	Gazprom’s	assets,	the	Itera	company,	was	deprived	of	the	concessions,	companies	
and	shares	in	the	company’s	extraction	companies	(Rospan,	Severneftegazprom,	Purgaz,	
Sibneftegaz	etc.)	which	it	had	obtained	for	a	very	low	price.	Gazprom	regained	the	control	
it	had	lost	during	Vyakhirev’s	term	in	office	over	Sibur,	Russia’s	largest	chemical	holding,	
and	Stroytransgaz,	a	company	involved	in	the	construction	of	pipelines,	whose	major	share	
packages	had	been	taken	over	by	relatives	of	the	former	managers	(including	Vyakhirev)	and	
the	company’s	political	protectors3.	
In	line	with	the	rules	of	property	redistribution	followed	by	subsequent	Kremlin-based	groups,	
after	 Vladimir	 Putin	 assumed	 the	 presidency,	 the	 regained	Gazprom	 assets	 (along	with	
many	other	properties)	were	redistributed	to	people	associated	with	the	new	ruling	class.	
The	most	valuable	parts	were	acquired	by	
Putin’s	friends,	collaborators	and	business	
partners	whom	he	had	worked	with	dur-
ing	his	career	 in	St.	Petersburg	city	hall,	
or	his	 close	allies	 from	 the	period	of	his	
KGB	service.	Other,	less	impressive	items	
fell	to	relatives	and	acquaintances	of	peo-
ple	associated	with	 the	 ruling	group	and	
the	new	Gazprom	executive	team.	
What	 differentiates	 the	 current	 process	 of	 dividing	 up	Gazprom	 from	 that	 performed	 in	
the	1990s	is	its	much	larger	scale	during	Putin’s	second	term	in	office,	which	accelerated	
in	 its	 final	months	 and	 is	 still	 continuing	 today.	 Some	 of	 the	 controversial	 transactions	
were	made	at	Putin’s	direct	request	(such	as	the	sale	of	the	insurance	company	Sogaz	to	
Bank	Rossiya	in	2004	for	an	exceptionally	low	price).	The	takeover	of	the	assets	–	in	non-
transparent,	multilevel	transactions	–	involves	a	network	of	mediator	companies	registered	
in	tax	havens,	which	makes	it	difficult	or	almost	impossible	to	identify	their	true	owners.	
The	assets	isolated	from	Gazprom	some	time	ago	and	regained	by	the	team	led	by	Alexey	
Miller	 currently	 form	 an	 important	 part,	 and	 in	many	 cases	 the	 initial	 start-up	 capital,	
of	the	dynamically	developing	new	oligarchic	empires.	The	biggest	beneficiaries	of	the	cur-
rent	phase	of	dividing	up	Gazprom’s	assets	include	the	following	persons:	
• Gennady Timchenko
Novatek: the gas part of the empire4	
The	profitable	purchase	of	Gazprom	assets	has	contributed	to	the	spectacular	growth	of	
Novatek	–	Russia’s	second	largest	(after	Gazprom	itself)	and	the	largest	of	all	independent	
gas	producers	(its	expected	total	extraction	volume	was	52	billion	m3	in	2011)5.	A	jump	
in	quality	for	Novatek	happened	when	in	2009	a	major	package	of	the	company’s	shares	
(23.5%)	was	acquired	by	Gennady	Timchenko,	whose	acquaintance	with	Putin	dates	back	
to	 their	KGB	intelligence	service	and	his	cooperation	with	St.	Petersburg	city	hall	 in	 the	
oil	trade6.	Since	then	the	Russian	state	has	supported	the	transformation	of	Novatek	into	
a	strong	actor	on	the	Russian	gas	market	by	any	means	possible.	Among	the	assets	which	
Novatek	purchased	from	Gazprom	were	share	packages	in	the	Severenergiya	(25%)	and	
Sibneftegaz	companies	(51%);	these	were	reclaimed	from	Itera,	whose	total	resources	are	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
3	 Including	Viktor	Chernomyrdin,	
a	co-founder	of	Gazprom,	and	
prime	minister	of	the	Russian	
Federation	from	1992–1998.	
	
	
	
	
	
4	 Timchenko’s	main	asset	is	the	
Gunvor	company,	Russia’s	lar-
gest	oil	trading	entity	(around	
40%	of	the	RF’s	exports).	
In	November	2011	Timchenko	
consolidated	93%	of	shares	
in	the	TransOil	company,	one	
of	Russia’s	largest	freight	rail	
operators	(holding	23%	
of	the	oil	transport	market).	
Timchenko	is	also	a	sharehol-
der	in	Bank	Rossiya	(around	
10%)	and	a	founder	of	
the	St.	Petersburg-based	
judo	club	Yarva-Neva,	
whose	honorary	president	
is	Vladimir	Putin.	
5	 For	comparison:	Novatek’s	
extraction	volume	levels	in	
2009	and	2010	was	
32.8	and	37.8	billion	m3	
respectively.	The	company’s	
development	strategy	provides	
the	extraction	volume	
to	double	by	2020,	
to	reach	over	100	billion	m3.	
6	 Timchenko	cooperated	
with	St.	Petersburg	city	hall,	
among	other	initiatives,	
in	the	controversial	‘Oil	for	
Food’	programme	managed	
by	Putin	in	the	early	1990s.	
Timchenko’s	business	partner	
and	co-owner	of	Novatek	
(27.2%)	is	Leonid	Mikhelson.
The most valuable parts were acquired 
by Putin’s friends, collaborators and 
business partners whom he had worked 
with during his career in St. Petersburg 
city hall, or his close allies from 
the period of his KGB service.
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estimated	at	1.6	trillion	m3,	together	concessions	to	exploit	several	fields.	Another	impor-
tant	asset	purchased	by	Novatek	was	the	Yamal	LNG	company,	along	with	 its	property,	
the	Yuzhnoye	Tambeyskoye	field	(over	800	billion	m3).	In	July	2011,	in	order	to	win	foreign	
investors	and	ensure	 the	profitability	of	 the	Yamal	LNG	project,	 the	government	granted	
it	significant	tax	reliefs	(zero	tax	rate	on	extraction	(NDPI)),	and	lifted	the	export	duty	on	
any	LNG	produced	in	the	future7.	
In	 August	 2011,	 as	 the	 only	 participant	 in	 the	 tender	 procedure	 (potential	 competitors	
were	not	allowed	to	take	part),	Novatek	gained	concessions	for	another	four	fields	in	Yamal	
(estimated	at	over	2	trillion	m3).	So	in	less	than	two	years,	the	confirmed	volume	of	resourc-
es	owned	by	Novatek	increased	six-fold	–	from	690	billion	m3	(at	the	end	of	2008)	to	over	
4	trillion	m3	(as	of	2011).
The	company’s	prestige	has	increased	due	to	its	international	contracts,	including	its	alli-
ance	with	a	strategic	partner,	the	French	company	Total,	which	purchased	slightly	over	12%	
of	Novatek’s	shares	with	the	option	to	increase	its	package	to	almost	20%,	and	which	since	
November	2011	has	been	a	shareholder	in	the	Yamal	LNG	project	(20%).	The	Norwegian	
company	StatoilHydro	and	Qatar	Petroleum	International	can	be	considered	as	other	stra-
tegic	partners.	
Novatek	is	the	only	independent	gas	company	in	Russia	which	can	compete	with	Gazprom	
on	 the	EU	gas	market	 and	acquire	 shares	 in	Western	 concerns.	 In	 July	2011,	 the	Ger-
man	energy	concern	EnBW	offered	to	sell	
Novatek	 25%	 of	 its	 shares	 (more	 than	
half	 of	 its	package)8	 in	VNG,	one	of	 the	
largest	 gas	 importers	 and	 distributors	
in	eastern	Germany	(negotiations	are	un-
derway).	Several	other	European	enterpris-
es	have	also	expressed	interest	in	Novatek	
as	a	possible	 shareholder.	Novatek’s	po-
tential	 partners	 expect	 cheaper	 supplies	
of	 gas	 compared	 with	 that	 delivered	 by	
Gazprom	 under	 its	 long-term	 contracts.	
Novatek’s	own	extraction	costs	(similar	to	the	costs	borne	by	other	independent	gas	com-
panies	 in	Russia)	are	several	 times	 lower	 than	the	costs	borne	by	Gazprom.	This	would	
harm	Gazprom’s	export	monopoly,	however.	
Timchenko	 also,	 within	 a	 short	 period	 of	 time	 and	 for	 symbolically	 low	 prices,	 bought	
other	Gazprom	assets	which	the	monopoly	had	considered	unrelated	to	its	basic	business.	
He	consolidated	80%	of	shares	in	Stroytransgaz,	a	company	created	by	Gazprom	specialis-
ing	in	the	construction	of	oil	and	gas	infrastructure	objects,	with	profitability	guaranteed	by	
large	contracts	realised	for	the	gas	monopolist	and	other	energy	companies	(including	Inter	
RAO	UES).	In	late	October	2011,	another	Gazprom	asset,	Russia’s	largest	chemical	hold-
ing	Sibur,	became	the	property	of	Timchenko	and	his	business	partner	Leonid	Mikhelson.	
Its	new	owners	purchased	a	package	of	nearly	50%	of	Sibur’s	shares	from	Gazprombank,	
thereby	 increasing	 their	 total	 share	package	 to	95%	 (in	2010	Mikhelson	bought	a	 total	
of	46%	of	the	holding’s	shares).	The	purchase	of	nearly	100%	of	Sibur’s	shares	was	pos-
sible	mainly	thanks	to	a	loan	provided	by	Gazprombank.	
• The Rotenberg brothers9 
Stroygazmontazh: the pipeline business 
In	2006,	the	brothers	Arkady	and	Boris	Rotenberg	–	Vladimir	Putin’s	childhood	friends	and	
fellow	sportsmen	 from	a	St.	Petersburg	 judo	club	 (and	members	of	 the	Yarva-Neva	club,	
whose	honorary	president	is	Vladimir	Putin)	–	received	a	profitable	contract	from	Gazprom	
	
7	 The	amendments	to	the	Rus-
sian	Federation’s	fiscal	law,	
signed	by	President	Medvedev	
on	21	July	2011,	also	cover	
the	oil	and	gas	deposits	on	the	
Black	Sea,	the	Sea	of	Okhotsk	
shelf	and	in	the	Far	North,	
with	state-owned	concerns	
Rosneft	and	Gazpromneft	
holding	concessions	to	exploit	
them.	For	the	Yamal	projects,	
the	zero	NDPI	rate	will	apply	
until	the	cumulative	extraction	
reaches	250	billion	m3.	So	far,	
this	only	applies	to	gas	used	
in	the	production	of	LNG.	Gaz-
prom	has	also	applied	for	the	
tax	on	extraction	carried	out	as	
part	of	its	Yamal	projects	to	be	
lifted.	
8	 EnBW	owns	48%	of	shares	
in	VNG.	The	control	package	
is	owned	by	EWE.
	
9	 Apart	from	the	assets	acquired	
from	Gazprom,	the	Rotenberg	
brothers	own	shares	in	SMP-	
-Bank;	control	over	a	dozen	
distilleries	which	are	part	
of	Rosspiritprom;	
co-own	Mostotrest,	Russia’s	
largest	bridge	construction	
company;	and	have	won	con-
tracts	for	the	construction	
of	toll	highways	(currently	
on	the	Moscow–St.	Petersburg).
Novatek’s potential partners expect 
cheaper supplies of gas compared with 
that delivered by Gazprom under its 
long-term contracts. Novatek’s own ex-
traction costs (similar to the costs borne 
by other independent gas companies 
in Russia) are several times lower 
than the costs borne by Gazprom.
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concerning	pipe	supplies.	The	next	year,	Gazprom	introduced	the	brothers	to	big	business	
by	selling	its	gas	pipelines	construction	companies	to	them.	The	Stroygazmontazh	company	
created	as	a	result	of	their	consolidation	is	Gazprom’s	largest	contractor,	carrying	out	mul-
ti-billion-dollar	 strategic	 projects	 of	 transfer	 hubs	 like	Nord	 Stream,	 Sakhalin-Khabarovsk-	
-Vladivostok,	Dzhugba-Lazarevskoye,	and	so	on.	In	2010	Stroygazmontazh	and	Stroygazkon-
sulting	(a	company	owned	by	a	Jordanian	Ziyad	Manasir,	 the	brothers’	acquaintance)	won	
two-thirds	of	the	tenders	for	the	construction	and	modernisation	of	sites	owned	by	Gazprom.	
The	 companies	 owned	 by	 the	 Rotenberg	 brothers	 are	 also	 Gazprom’s	 pipe	 suppliers.	
In	2005–2010	they	won	45	of	the	48	tenders	announced	by	the	company	to	supply	pipes	
and	other	elements	for	the	assembly	of	gas	pipeline	networks.	Since	2009	they	have	owned	
50%	of	Eurotube,	a	steel	trading	company	registered	in	Germany,	which	is	the	largest	supplier	
of	pipes	(over	a	third	of	the	total	market	share)	to	Russia.	Eurotube’s	main	client	is	Gazprom,	
although	it	also	supplies	pipes	to	Transneft,	Rosneft	and	other	Russian	businesses.	
In	April	2010	 the	Rotenberg	brothers	were	mentioned	on	 the	Forbes	 list	 of	 billionaires,	
and	Gazprom	sold	them	another	non-core	asset	–	the	company	Gazprombureniye,	which	
implements	 70%	 of	 the	 company’s	 contracts	 (involving	 geological	 analyses,	 construc-
tion,	renovation,	maintenance	of	oil	and	gas	wells	and	underground	gas	storage	facilities)	
and	carries	out	work	in	the	Bovanenkovo	gas	field	in	the	Yamal	Peninsula.	
• Yuri Kovalchuk 
SOGAZ, Gazprombank, media: a financial and media empire
Some	of	Gazprom’s	assets	have	formed	the	basis	for	a	spectacular	surge	in	the	holdings	
and	influence	of	Yuri	Kovalchuk,	another	of	Putin’s	acquaintances	from	St.	Petersburg	and	
the	co-founder	(alongside	Putin)	of	the	Ozero	co-operative	society	for	summer	residences.	
Gazprom’s	shares	were	gradually	acquired	from	2004	at	bargain	prices	by	the	commercial	
Bank	Rossiya,	which	Kovalchuk	 controls;	 these	 have	multiplied	 the	 bank’s	 capital	 from	
US$216	million	in	2005	to	US$9.6	billion	as	of	the	end	of	201010.	
In	2005	Gazprom	sold	its	company	SOGAZ,	one	of	Russia’s	largest	insurance	companies,	
to	Bank	Rossiya	for	around	US$100	m.	Under	the	bank’s	control	SOGAZ’s	premium	rates	
increased	dramatically,	due	to	the	insurance	contracts	it	entered	into	with	large	state	en-
terprises	(Russian	Railways,	Rosenergoatom,	etc.).	For	example,	the	premium	rate	for	its	
recent	contract	(November	2011)	with	Gazprom	for	the	period	2012–2016	amounted	to	
nearly	US$3	billion.	The	subject	of	the	contract	is	the	insurance	of	the	company’s	property	
(over	US$1	billion)	 and	additional	medi-
cal	insurance	(US$1.2	billion).	According	
to	 SOGAZ’s	 annual	 report	 in	 2010,	 the	
value	of	its	assets	exceeded	US$3	billion,	
and	the	value	of	contracts	concluded	last	
year	was	US$2	billion.
In	2005	Bank	Rossiya	purchased	another	
valuable	 asset	 from	 Gazprom,	 the	 com-
pany	LIDER,	which	among	other	activities	
manages	the	company’s	pension	fund	and	
the	Gazfond	 investment	 fund.	As	 Lider’s	
owner,	 Bank	 Rossiya	 acquired	 the	 com-
pany’s	Gazprombank	package	(43%)	along	with	shares	in	various	subsidiaries	of	Gazprom	
which	it	transferred	to	Gazprombank’s	assets11.	This	enabled	Kovalchuk,	the	largest	share-
holder	 in	Bank	Rossiya	(30.4%)	to	acquire,	among	other	items,	significant	media	assets	
important	 for	 the	 Kremlin	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 electoral	 campaigns,	 and	 thus	 in	 effect	
control	 over	 the	Gazprom-Media	holding.	On	 this	basis,	he	has	created	Russia’s	 largest	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
10	According	to	its	annual	report,	
as	of	the	end	of	2010	the	
value	of	assets	owned	by	Bank	
Rossiya	was	267.07	billion	ro-
ubles,	its	equity	26.02	billion	
roubles,	and	its	net	profit	
1.6	billion	roubles.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
11	Gazprombank	was	the	‘deposit	
box’	for	assets	Gazprom	consi-
dered	as	not	directly	related	to	
the	company’s	business	profile	
(which	included	the	control	
package	of	the	Gazprom-Me-
dia	holding,	Atomstroyeksport,	
United	Machinebuilding	
Plants,	Sibur),	and	the	direct	
seller	of	these	assets.	
Along with the assets making up 
the Gazprom-Media group, Kovalchuk 
has gained control over Russia’s 
largest nationwide media (TV and 
radio stations, newspapers) and 
thus created Russia’s biggest media 
holding. He also took over Video 
International company – a giant on 
the Russian media advertising market.
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12	Gazprom	gained	full	control	
over	the	gas	transportation	
system	in	1997	by	way	of	
compensation	for	the	obliga-
tion	to	supply	cheap	gas	to	
the	domestic	market	(at	that	
time,	the	regulated	domestic	
prices	were	lower	than	the	
production	costs).	The	current	
gas	prices	in	Russia	are	3	to	
5	times	higher	(depending	on	
the	region)	than	Gazprom’s	
own	average	costs.
media	holding	(including	the	national	TV	stations	NTV,	TNT,	REN	TV,	Petersburg,	5-Kanal,	
the	Izvestiya	newspaper,	the	Video-International	company	–	a	giant	on	the	Russian	media	
advertising	market	–	and	many	others).	
The market situation demands Gazprom’s privileges to be curbed
During	his	two	periods	as	President	(2000–2008),	Vladimir	Putin	significantly	strength-
ened	the	position	of	the	gas	company	in	both	Russia’s	economy	and	its	politics.	In	2006	
the	Duma	adopted	a	law	which	guaranteed	Gazprom	exclusive	license	to	export	all	types	of	
gas.	In	the	same	year,	in	order	to	prevent	potential	competition	from	Central	Asian	gas	on	
the	European	market,	a	ban	was	introduced	on	the	international	transfer	of	gas	via	the	terri-
tory	of	the	Russian	Federation.	The	government	made	every	effort	to	improve	the	monopo-
list’s	financial	situation.	In	2003–2010	the	share	of	excise	taxes	and	duties	in	Gazprom’s	
export	revenues	was	reduced	from	26%	to	16%.	The	future	profitability	of	the	company’s	
undertakings	on	the	domestic	market	was	guaranteed	by	a	government	programme	involv-
ing	a	gradual	increase	in	the	wholesale	price	of	gas	in	Russia	(on	average	by	15–20%	per	
year);	this	was	launched	in	2007,	and	is	aimed	at	levelling	out	the	profitability	threshold	
of	the	domestic	and	European	markets.
It	became	apparent	that	all	changes	on	the	gas	markets,	both	domestic	and	European,	both	
good	and	poor	economic	situation,	posed	serious	challenges	to	the	company’s	monopolist	
position.	For	example,	the	problems	Gazprom	faced	during	a	period	of	prosperity	on	the	
EU’s	gas	market	(2005–2008),	which	were	related	to	maintaining	the	volume	of	extrac-
tion	necessary	 to	meet	demand	 from	domestic	clients	as	well	as	 the	expected	 increase	
in	exports,	mobilised	other	gas	producers	(oil	companies	independent	of	Gazprom)	to	in-
crease	their	production.	This	posed	a	challenge	to	the	privileges	enjoyed	by	the	monopolist,	
involving	very	significant	reduction	of	the	profitability	of	gas	production	outside	of	the	Gaz-
prom	system	(in	particular	the	lack	of	access	of	independent	companies	to	the	gas	transpor-
tation	system	and	export	contracts,	which	hampered	the	sector’s	development).
Despite	 a	major	 change	 in	 the	market	 situation	 after	 2008	 (a	 drop	 in	 demand	 for	 gas	
in	Europe	caused	by	the	economic	crisis),	there	was	an	upsurge	in	the	extraction	of	gas	
by	Russian	producers	independent	of	Gazprom.	This	resulted	from	the	growing	profitability	
of	 the	domestic	market,	which	 translated	 into	greater	 expectations	 for	 those	companies	
regarding	the	conditions	for	operation	on	the	domestic	market.	
The pipeline monopoly.	Gazprom’s	exclusive	right	to	dispose	of	the	system	of	Russian	pipe-
lines	is	its	most	widely	criticised	privilege12.	The	monopoly	hampers	or	blocks	other	com-
panies’	operations	by	 limiting	or	 refusing	
to	accept	supplies	provided	by	independ-
ent	producers	to	its	pipelines,	eliminating	
the	possibility	of	connecting	new	fields	to	
the	 system,	 etc.	 One	 of	 the	 few	 excep-
tions	was	a	long-term	contract	concluded	
in	2010	with	Novatek,	enabling	the	latter	
to	 supply	10	billion	m3	of	 its	 gas	 to	 the	
pipeline	network	per	year.	
The	Gazprom	 leadership’s	 reluctance	 towards	any	projects	 to	 split	up	 the	company	has	
gained	unequivocal	 support	 from	Vladimir	Putin.	During	his	presidency	Putin	 repeatedly	
rejected	proposals	to	restructure	the	company	and	projects	to	transform	the	gas	transporta-
tion	system	into	an	independent	structure	modelled	upon	Transneft	(with	continued	state	
control	over	the	transfer	infrastructure).
Gazprom hampers or blocks other 
companies’ operations by limiting or 
refusing to accept supplies provided by 
independent producers to its pipelines, 
eliminating the possibility of connecting 
new fields to the system, etc. 
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13	The	extraction	potential	of	
Russia’s	independent	gas	
producers	(including	oil	
corporations),	which	control	
around	30%	of	the	country’s	
gas	resources,	is	estimated	at	
400–500	billion	m3	per	year	
(the	actual	extraction	volume	
of	independent	companies	in	
2010	was	142	billion	m3).	
Prime	Minister	Putin’s	comment	on	this	suggestion	(in	February	2011)	came	as	a	surprise.	
He	criticised	Gazprom	for	excessive	use	of	its	monopoly	rights	to	dispose	of	the	gas	trans-
portation	system;	he	did	not	question	the	principle	of	Gazprom’s	exclusivity	in	this	area,	
but	he	returned	the	issue	of	liberalising	access	to	Gazprom’s	network	to	the	public	debate.	
On	7	July	2011	the	Federal	Antitrust	Service	(FAS)	filed	a	bill	with	the	government	concern-
ing	non-discriminatory	access	for	all	gas	producers	to	the	gas	transportation	system.	Despite	
the	undisputed	need	to	adopt	such	a	solution	(Gazprom’s	extraction	programme	is	stagnat-
ing,	and	there	is	a	need	for	independent	companies	to	stimulate	the	growth	of	gas	produc-
tion13,	limit	the	consumption	of	petroleum	gas,	and	increase	the	competition	on	the	domestic	
market,	and	so	on),	it	seems	unlikely	that	the	gas	transportation	system	will	undergo	real	
isolation	from	Gazprom	in	the	foreseeable	future.	For	example,	the	recent	FAS	bill	filed	with	
the	government	(in	October	2011)	merely	obligates	the	monopoly	to	disclose	information	on	
available	transfer	capacity	on	individual	routes	and	on	the	number	of	registered	applications	
for	gas	transfer	and	connection	to	the	system.	On	the	one	hand,	the	incompleteness	of	this	
proposal	testifies	to	the	power	of	Gazprom’s	influence	concerning	its	privileges	over	the	leg-
islative	process;	but	on	the	other,	it	suggests	that	the	very	fact	that	the	issue	is	being	dealt	
with	at	such	a	high	level	is	a	sign	that	pressure	on	the	company	is	growing.
The export monopoly.	Under	the	law,	the	only	exceptions	from	Gazprom’s	export	monopoly	
have	been	 those	projects	carried	out	on	 the	basis	of	Production	Separation	Agreements	
(PSA).	However,	none	of	the	companies	which	carried	out	two	such	gas	projects	in	Rus-
sia	has	been	able	to	sell	gas	to	foreign	clients	independently.	The	first	project,	Sakhalin-2	
(with	Shell	as	 its	operator),	was	 taken	over	by	Gazprom	 together	with	 the	contracts	 for	
the	export	of	LNG,	already	signed	at	that	
time.	 The	 gas	 part	 of	 the	 other	 project,	
Sakhalin-1,	 was	 suspended.	 Despite	
the	plans	laid	by	the	investors	(the	Ameri-
can	company	Exxon	Mobil	as	 the	opera-
tor,	 Japan’s	 SODECO,	 India’s	ONGK	and	
Rosneft)	 –	 who	 as	 early	 as	 2006	 had	
signed	a	preliminary	agreement	with	 the	
Chinese	company	CNPC	to	export	gas	to	
China	 –	 Gazprom	 decided	 that	 the	 gas	
from	Sakhalin-1	would	be	used	for	domes-
tic	consumption.	In	February	2012	Exxon	
offered	 to	 sell	 Gazprom	 its	 gas	 assets	
in	the	project.	
The	first	crack	in	Gazprom’s	export	monopoly	was	caused	indirectly	by	Novatek.	The	agree-
ment	between	Gazprom	and	Novatek	(signed	in	March	2010),	concerning	conditions	for	ex-
porting	around	15	billion	tons	of	liquefied	gas	per	year	from	the	Yamal	LNG	project	operated	
by	Novatek	(which	is	scheduled	to	launch	in	2016)	stipulates	that	Gazprom	will	formally	
maintain	its	exporter	status	and	receive	its	agency	fee,	whereas	Novatek	will	have	a	major	
share	in	the	revenue	generated	from	the	sale	of	gas.	Gazprom’s	unprecedented	consent	to	
split	the	export	revenue	would	probably	not	have	been	possible	without	the	political	protec-
tion	extended	to	Novatek	by	the	Russian	government.	
Other	gas	producers	are	not	so	lucky.	Despite	the	lobbying	efforts	undertaken	by	the	influ-
ential	deputy	prime	minister	Igor	Sechin,	the	state-owned	Rosneft	has	been	applying	since	
2005	for	the	possibility	 to	export	gas	to	China,	so	far	without	success.	The	subsequent	
rounds	 of	 talks	 between	 the	 company	 and	 Gazprom	 concerning	 the	 proposed	 creation	
of	an	export	joint	venture	have	also	been	futile.	Another	company,	TNK-BP,	which	applied	
The first crack in Gazprom’s exports 
monopoly was the company’s 
unprecedented consent to sharing 
the export revenues with Novatek. 
The agreement concerning the condi-
tions for the export of liquefied gas 
from the Yamal project carried out 
by Novatek stipulates that Gazprom 
formally maintains its exporter status 
and receives a small fee, while 
Novatek takes the export revenues.
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14	 In	March	2011,	Vladimir	
Putin	appealed	to	Gazprom’s	
governing	bodies	to	lift	the	
‘take	or	pay’	rule	in	relation	
to	domestic	clients,	and	to	
eliminate	penalties	for	too	low	
or	too	high	demand	compared	
with	the	contracted	volume.	In	
October	2011,	Putin	ordered	
deputy	prime	minister	Igor	Se-
chin,	the	government’s	energy	
sector	custodian,	to	prepare	
the	necessary	documentation.	
for	the	right	to	export	gas	to	China	(from	the	Kovykta	field	in	the	Irkutsk	Oblast)	had	to	sell	
the	Kovykta	project	to	Gazprom	due	to	the	lack	of	any	such	possibility,	among	other	reasons.	
Other	Russian	companies	have	attempted	to	bypass	Gazprom’s	exports	monopoly.	For	ex-
ample	LUKoil,	without	any	mediation	on	the	part	of	Gazprom,	signed	a	memorandum	of	un-
derstanding	in	2010	with	China’s	CNPC	which	provides	for	supplies	of	around	15	billion	m3	
of	gas	per	year	(starting	from	2014);	however,	this	concerns	gas	from	projects	carried	out	
in	Uzbekistan.	In	May	2011	the	Yakutsk	Fuel	and	Energy	Company	(part	of	the	Summa	
Capital	investment	group)	opened	talks	with	the	Korean	company	KOGAZ	on	the	possible	
export	of	gas	to	Korea.	
Vladimir	Putin	has	not	ruled	out	 liberalising	Russian	gas	exports	 in	the	future;	yet	 in	his	
opinion,	Gazprom’s	monopoly	in	this	area	prevents	Russian	companies	from	competing	on	
various	markets,	and	supports	gas	price	stability.	
Increased competition on the domestic market. In	the	context	of	the	change	in	the	situation	
on	the	domestic	market,	which	since	2007	has	not	generated	any	losses	due	to	the	gradual	
increase	in	the	price	of	gas,	and	has	been	running	at	a	profit	since	2008,	Gazprom	faces	
growing	competition	on	the	part	of	other	suppliers	(Novatek,	 Itera	and	oil	corporations).	
Gas	delivered	by	Gazprom,	which	is	also	
provided	 on	 the	 domestic	 market	 under	
long-term	contracts	with	the	‘take	or	pay’	
clause	at	regulated	prices,	is	more	expen-
sive	(by	10–15%)	than	the	gas	offered	by	
its	competitors.	Also,	the	supply	conditions	
Gazprom	offers	are	less	favourable;	for	in-
stance,	the	company	requires	100%	of	the	
due	amount	to	be	paid	in	advance,	while	
other	 suppliers	 demand	 a	mere	 30%	 in	
advance.	Prime	Minister	Putin’s	repeated	
suggestions	to	eliminate	the	‘take	or	pay’	
clause	 from	 domestic	 contracts	 have	 so	
far	 fallen	on	deaf	ears14.	 In	2009–2011,	
Novatek	acquired	a	share	in	the	most	profitable	market	of	the	monopolist’s	corporate	clients	
in	several	oblasts;	for	example,	it	entered	the	market	in	Chelyabinsk	oblast,	and	in	Novem-
ber	2011	it	purchased	51%	of	the	company	Mezhregiongaz	Chelabinsk	from	Gazprom,	with	
the	option	of	 increasing	the	share	package	to	100%.	The	agreement	between	Novatek’s	
chief	and	the	oblast’s	governor	stipulates	an	increase	in	the	supplier’s	share	of	the	oblast’s	
gas	market	to	90%	by	2020.	
In	2009,	Inter	RAO	UES	and	OGK-1	(power	stations	and	thermal	power	plants	in	the	Perm	
and	Moscow	oblasts	and	in	the	Yamalo-Nenets	autonomous	okrug)	availed	themselves	of	
the	right	to	terminate	their	agreement	with	Gazprom,	and	since	1	January	2010	have	been	
buying	 gas	 from	Novatek	 (under	 five-year	 contracts).	 Furthermore,	 Itera	 has	 taken	 over	
some	of	Gazprom’s	clients	in	the	Sverdlovsk	and	Moscow	oblasts.	LUKoil	and	TNK-BP	have	
announced	ambitious	plans	to	develop	their	gas	market	segments	and	increase	production	
volumes,	and	Rosneft	is	involved	in	talks	with	Gazprom	concerning	the	creation	of	a	gas	
trade	company	in	Russia.	
The	activity	of	gas	producers	and	oil	corporations	independent	of	Gazprom	on	the	domestic	
market	is	growing	rapidly.	According	to	estimates,	as	of	2011	these	companies	have	100%	
of	the	market	share	 in	Sverdlovsk	oblast,	95%	in	Kemerovo	oblast,	58%	in	Tyumen	oblast,	
55%	of	Novosibirsk	oblast,	and	their	share	in	the	Russian	market	as	a	whole	has	exceeded	25%.	
The relatively unrestrained develop-
ment of competition on the ever more 
lucrative domestic gas market may 
suggest that the Kremlin plans to 
reduce Gazprom’s activity to exports 
at the expense of the company’s 
involvement in the domestic market. 
The monopolist’s own extraction costs 
are growing so rapidly  that expensive 
Russian gas can only generate decent 
revenues on foreign markets.
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Conclusions and forecast 
•	Both	Gazprom	itself	and	the	Russian	gas	sector	have	recently	been	subject	to	processes	
which	may	challenge	the	state-owned	company’s	unique	status,	with	all	that	this	implies	for	
such	a	change	in	Russia’s	economy	and	politics.	The	possible	repercussions	include:	
-	 the	redistribution	of	property;
-	 the	spectacular	development	of	Novatek	–	 the	government’s	new	favourite	 in	 the	gas	
sector;
-	 the	erosion	of	Gazprom’s	monopolist	privileges;
-	 the	weakening	of	the	company’s	dominant	position	on	the	domestic	market.
• Gazprom’s	assets	have	formed	the	basis	for	the	multi-billion	fortunes	of	Putin’s	oligarchs:	
Gennady	 Timchenko	 (Novatek),	 the	 brothers	 Arkady	 and	 Boris	 Rotenberg	 (involved	 in	
the	 import	of	pipes	and	the	construction	
of	pipelines,	among	other	activities),	Yuri	
Kovalchuk	 (active	 in	 the	 insurance	 and	
media	 sector,	 among	 others)	 and	 many	
other	people	associated	with	 the	current	
ruling	 elite.	 Any	 further	 redistribution	
of	 the	monopolist’s	 assets	 is	 a	 privilege	
of	the	government.	In	Russian	reality,	no-
body	questions	their	unwritten	right	to	di-
spose	of	the	assets	of	state-owned	enter-
prises	(and	in	fact	not	just	the	state-owned	
companies,	 and	not	 only	Gazprom),	 and	
the	gas	concern	has	never	been	a	strictly	
commercial	undertaking.	This	current	phase	in	its	development	differs	from	the	previous	
ones	in	terms	of	its	scale	and	the	provenance	of	its	beneficiaries	–	their	close	connection	
with	one	key	person	–	the	leader	of	the	elite.	
•	 The	 spectacular	 growth	 of	 Novatek	 can	 also	 be	 examined	 in	 the	 context	 of	 politics.	
The	empire	controlled	by	Gennady	Timchenko,	which	was	created	some	time	ago,	has	star-
ted	to	develop	its	gas	segment	only	recently.	Timchenko	acquired	the	most	significant	and	
most	profitable	gas	assets	from	Gazprom	in	the	last	three	years.	According	to	numerous	
analysts,	this	is	one	of	the	most	spectacular	episodes	of	the	increasingly	dynamic	process	
of	transferring	assets	from	state-owned	to	private	companies	involving	people	from	various	
levels	of	government.	The	transfer	of	assets	from	Gazprom	to	private	companies	registered	
outside	Russia	may	be	a	form	of	safe	investment,	representing	the	current	elite’s	provisions	
for	the	future.	It	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	–	considering	the	critical	approach	towards	Gaz-
prom	on	foreign	markets	which	see	it	as	a	tool	of	Kremlin	policy	–	the	growth	of	Novatek	
is	a	part	of	Moscow’s	plan	to	create	a	new	market	player	and	introduce	it	to	the	European	
business	as	a	strong	‘independent’	gas	company	which	could	strengthen	Russia’s	position	
on	the	EU	market.	
•	The	ever	more	frequent	challenges	to	Gazprom’s	monopolist	privileges,	in	particular	the	
right	to	dispose	of	the	domestic	pipeline	network,	may	be	much	more	important	 for	the	
developments	in	Russia’s	key	sector.	True	liberalisation	of	access	to	the	gas	transportation	
system	would	be	a	breakthrough	for	the	Russian	gas	market,	as	it	could	initiate	a	reform	of	
the	whole	sector.	This	seems	rather	unlikely	in	the	immediate	future,	because	the	govern-
ment	–	which	has	adjusted	Gazprom’s	business	model	to	their	needs	and	purposes	–	is	not	
In 2009, Inter RAO UES and OGK-1 
availed themselves of the right to ter-
minate their agreement with Gazprom, 
and since 1 January 2010 have been 
buying gas from Novatek. Furthermore, 
Itera has taken over some of Gazprom’s 
clients. LUKoil and TNK-BP 
have announced ambitious plans 
to develop their gas market segments 
and increase production volumes.
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15	 The	quality	of	Gazprom’s	re-
sources	is	decreasing	year	on	
year,	and	its	costs	of	extracting	
gas	from	the	fields	in	Western	
Siberia,	60%	of	which	have	
now	been	exploited,	are	on	
the	rise.	New	projects	require	
massive	investments.
interested	in	truly	weakening	the	monopolist.	The	result	of	the	growing	need	to	introduce	
such	a	solution	will	most	probably	be	a	half-measure	–	perhaps	a	new	legal	act	which	wo-
uld	provide	a	formal	framework	for	the	company’s	relations	with	other	entities	and	prevent	
it	from	blocking	certain	projects	(as	in	the	Kovykta	case).	In	the	longer	term,	though,	the	
liberalisation	of	access	to	the	monopolist’s	network	seems	unavoidable.	The	company	will	
gradually	lose	its	share	on	the	domestic	market	to	the	independent	producers,	which	will	
force	the	opening	up	of	the	network.	
•	In	the	foreseeable	future,	the	company’s	monopoly	on	exports	seems	less	at	risk,	mainly	
due	to	the	role	of	Gazprom	and	the	export	of	gas	as	important	tools	in	maintaining	Russia’s	
influences	in	Europe	and	the	CIS.	In	the	context	of	changes	on	the	European	gas	market	
(the	oversupply	of	gas,	growing	competition	between	the	suppliers,	and	diversification	of	
supply	 routes),	and	of	 frequent	challenges	 to	Gazprom’s	pricing	policy	by	 its	customers,	
maintaining	 the	 export	monopoly	 in	 order	 to	 block	 competition	 and	maximise	 prices	 is	
no	 longer	 reasonable,	but	on	 the	other	hand,	 the	 lifting	of	 this	monopoly	could	damage	
the	company’s	position	on	the	domestic	market.
Currently,	any	exceptions	to	this	rule	(as	in	the	case	of	Novatek)	will	only	be	possible	at	
the	request	of	Vladimir	Putin,	and	only	for	those	selected	few	companies	which	are	under	
the	government’s	strict	control.	Only	a	change	in	the	market	situation	–	a	significant	increase	
in	the	demand	for	Russian	gas	which	the	concern	would	be	unable	to	cover	–	could	force	
liberalisation	of	the	export	monopoly,	but	even	so	that	would	not	bring	about	its	abolition.
•	What	seems	difficult	to	stop,	is	the	process	of	other	producers	pushing	the	monopolist	out	
of	the	domestic	market.	Had	it	not	been	for	the	crisis	which	eliminated	the	threat	of	a	gas	
shortage	in	Russia,	Gazprom	would	have	had	serious	problems	covering	both	domestic	and	
foreign	demand.	Until	the	future	launch	of	the	Yamal	fields,	over	the	next	ten	years	Russia	
will	barely	be	able	to	reach	the	expected	extraction	volume	without	the	active	participation	
of	independent	companies.	Their	investments	in	expanding	their	production	may	be	profita-
ble	when	wider	access	to	the	increasingly	lucrative	domestic	market	is	guaranteed.	
In	the	medium	term,	Gazprom	is	likely	to	remain	Russia’s	main	gas	supplier;	at	the	end	of	
2010	it	controlled	around	70%	of	 the	Russian	market.	The	relatively	unrestrained	deve-
lopment	of	competition	on	the	ever	more	lucrative	domestic	gas	market	may	suggest	that	
the	Kremlin	plans	to	reduce	Gazprom’s	activity	to	exports	at	the	expense	of	the	company’s	
involvement	in	the	domestic	market.	The	monopolist’s	own	extraction	costs	are	growing	so	
rapidly15	that	expensive	Russian	gas	can	only	generate	decent	revenues	on	foreign	markets.	
The	monopolist	may	see	the	domestic	market	as	its	priority	(with	all	the	resulting	consequ-
ences	for	independent	producers)	only	if	there	is	a	collapse	in	the	exports	of	Russian	gas.
